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MISSOURI DEFAMATION , LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
In Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc.1 the United States Supreme Court
"federalized major aspects of libel law by declaring unconstitutional in
important respects the prevailing defamation law in all or most of the 50
states." 2 The Court held that so long as the states do not impose liabil-
ity without fault, they may choose the standard of liability applicable in
an action for defamation brought by a private individual against a news
medium.' This is to be contrasted with the strict liability imposed by the
common law.4 In addition, the Court held that actual damages may not
be presumed and punitive damages may not be awarded to a private
defamation plaintiff, at least in the absence of a showing that the defen-
dant acted with knowledge of the falsity of the defamatory statement or
in reckless disregard of the truth.5 At common law actual damages
were presumed in many cases and punitive damages were awarded
routinely.6
The courts of at least 18 states have had occasion since Gertz to con-
sider its application to their defamation law,7 but there are no reported
Missouri cases on the problem. The purposes of this comment are to
provide a summary of existing Missouri defamation law and to explore
the potential impact of Gertz on that body of law. Part II summarizes
Missouri law as it existed prior to the landmark case of New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan." The first section of Part III considers New York Times
and its progeny (including Missouri cases), while the second section of
Part III analyzes Gertz. Part IV summarizes the response of other states
to Gertz. Part V considers the potential impact of Gertz on Missouri def-
amation law and includes recommendations.
1. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
2. Id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 347.
4. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 113 (4th ed. 1971); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
5. 418 U.S. at 349.
6. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 112.
7. See Part IV infra.
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The reader should keep in mind throughout Part II
that its purpose is to consider Missouri defamation law as it existed prior to the
impact of New York Times and its progeny; as a result, some of the rules stated in
Part II are no longer correct, and reference must be made to Part III for the
applicable constitutional principles. Footnotes throughout Part II indicate mzin
areas of change resulting from United States Supreme Court cases.
270
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MISSOURI DEFAMATION LAW
II. MissouRi DEFAMATION LAW
A. In General
In Missouri, as at common law,9 the essence of an action for defa-
mation is damage to reputation in the opinion of others.10 Thus, to a
certain extent, whether a particular statement is defamatory depends
upon "the temper of the times, the current of contemporary public
opinion, with the result that words, harmless in one age, in one com-
munity, may be highly damaging to reputation at another time or in a
different place."' 1I Since the plaintiff's reputation is at stake, a judg-
ment for nominal damages may be obtained to redeem his reputation
despite the fact that actual damages are slight.' 2
Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander. In
general, slander is oral and libel is written; the chief modern distinction
is that some defamatory words if written are actionable without proof of
actual damage while the same words are not actionable if spoken unless
the plaintiff can show special damage.' 3 The law does not always keep
pace with technology; it is unsettled in Missouri whether defamation
published via radio or television constitutes libel or slander.' 4 While
9. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 111.
10. Harbison v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 327 Mo. 440, 37 S.W.2d 609 (1931).
11. Lightfoot v. Jennings, 363 Mo. 878, 882, 254 S.W.2d 596, 599 (1953)
(dictum) (calling plaintiff a "damned communist" was slanderous per se as im-
puting that plaintiff advocated the violent overthrow of the United States gov-
ernment, which was a crime under federal and state statutes).
12. See Coats v. News Corp., 355 Mo. 778, 197 S.W.2d 958 (1946) (judgment
for $1 actual and $1 punitive damages upheld).
13. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 112 at 752. See more detailed explanation of
slander and libel in Part II, §§ B, C infra.
14. There appear to be no reported Missouri cases deciding the issue. In
McDonald v. R.L. Polk & Co., 346 Mo. 615, 142 S.W.2d 635 (1940), the court
cited with approval a Nebraska case, Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W.
82, appeal dismissed, 290 U.S. 599 (1932), which held that broadcast defamation is
libel where the words are read from a written script. However, the McDonald
court was citing Sorensen for the proposition that there is strict liability for publi-
cation of defamatory statements. McDonald itself involved a printed letter circu-
lated by a mass mailing company. Coffey v. Midland Broadcast Co., 8 F. Supp.
889 (W.D. Mo. 1934) (applying Missouri law), found that the plaintiff had stated
a cause of action for defamation via radio, but did not say whether it was libel or
slander. Riss v. Anderson, 304 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1962) (applying Missouri law),
avoided deciding whether television defamation was libel or slander by holding
the remarks in question were defamatory per se in either event.
Most other state courts that have faced the issue have held broadcast defa-
mation is libel, at least where there is a written script. Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 1311,
1319 (1973). Another modern approach is to designate broadcast defamation as
libel on the ground that widespread dissemination makes it more harmful to the
plaintiff, a rationale commonly used in distinguishing written from oral defama-
tion. See, e.g., Shor v. Billingsley, 4 Misc. 2d 857, 158 N.Y.S. 2d 476, affd rem., 4
App. Div. 2d 1017, 169 N.Y.S. 2d 416, appeal denied, 5 App. Div. 2d 768, 170
N.Y.S. 2d 976 (1956).
2
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there may be some modern tendency to blur the distinction, the Missouri
Supreme Court has stated recently that libel and slander are distinguish-
able causes of action in Missouri.' 5  An important consequence of this
holding is that if the plaintiff misconceives his cause of action and pleads
slander when he should have pleaded libel, or vice versa, he will be
barred from amending his petition after the running of the statute of
limitations because an amended pleading relates back to the time of fil-
ing of the original pleading only where the claim stated in the amended
pleading is essentially the same as the original claim.1 6
Given that the-gravamen of defamation is injury to reputation in
others' eyes, the cause of action cannot arise without "publication" of the
allegedly defamatory statement. In the case of slander, the words must
be spoken in the presence or hearing of someone other than the plain-
tiff and defendant.' 7  Apparently the same requirement of publication
to a third person applies in libel cases.18 Although the common law rule
15. Laux v. Motor Carriers Council of St. Louis, Inc., 499 S.W.2d 805 (1973).
The reasons given were: libel actions in Missouri are sui generis by reason of a
constitutional provision that the jury shall judge the law and the facts in libel
cases [see Part II, § C infra]; libel and slander have different elements and
different penalties; the law of slander is narrower in scope; written words are in
more permanent form and can be circulated more extensively and do greater
injury; and § 559.400, RSMo 1969 makes only certain classes of slander mis-
demeanors while all libels within § 559.410 are made misdemeanors under §
559.420. 499 S.W.2d at 808.
16. 499 S.W.2d at 807-08.
17. Lonergan v. Love, 235 Mo. App. 1066, 150 S.W.2d 534 (St. L. Ct. App.
1941); Harbison v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 327 Mo. 440, 37 S.W.2d 609 (1931).
In Harbison a husband and wife were accused of stealing goods from a railroad
boxcar, and the court found in the husband's slander action that there was no
publication to the wife because she, being jointly accused, was not a third party
within the meaning of the law of publication. Accord, Starnes v. St. Joseph Ry.,
Light, Heat & Power Co., 331 Mo. 44, 52 S.W.2d 852 (1932).
18. An early supreme court case, Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo. 433, 440
(1883), stated the common law rule that there must be publication to third per-
sons and that publication to the plaintiff alone will not suffice. However, the
Kansas City and St. Louis Courts of Appeals subsequently held that a statute
defining publication in criminal libel cases, now § 559.430, RSMo 1969, applied
in civil libel actions as well. Bedell v. Richardson Lubricating Co., 226 S.W. 653
(K.C. Mo. App. 1920); Wright v. Great Northern Ry., 186 S.W. 1085 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1916); Houston v. Woolley, 37 Mo. App. 15 (K.C. Ct. App. 1889). Contra,
Howard v. Wilson, 195 Mo. App. 532, 192 S.W. 473 (Spr. Ct. App. 1917) (dic-
tum).
Section 559.430, RSMo 1969 provides:
No printing, writing or other thing is a libel unless there has been a
publication thereof, by delivering, selling, reading or otherwise com-
municating the same or causing the same to be delivered, sold, read,
or otherwise communicated to one or more persons or to the party
libeled, or by exposing or exhibiting such libelous thing or matter in
some public place, or where it may be seen or observed by the public.
The statute incorporates the criminal libel rule that publication to the person
defamed is actionable as tending to provoke breach of the peace. W. PROSSER,
[Vol. 43272
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is generally that publication may be made to the defendant's own agents,
employees or officers,' 9 at least one Missouri case has held that com-
munications between officers of the same corporation in the due course
of corporate business or between different offices of the same corpora-
tion does not constitute publication to third persons.20  It is clear that
republication, i.e., repeating someone else's defamatory remark, is ac-
tionable.21
Assuming that publication is found, a defamation action requires
that the allegedly defamatory remarks refer to the plaintiff. In Coats v.
News Corp. 22 the Missouri Supreme Court embraced the Restatement of
Torts position that "[a] defamatory communication is made concerning
the person who its recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, un-
derstands it as intended to refer." 23 Whether an allegedly defamatory
publication refers to the plaintiff is a jury question.24
Before discussing libel and slander in more detail, some procedural
points should be noted. There is a two-year statute of limitations for
defamation.25 A defamation action abates upon the death of the plain-
tiff or the defendant.2 6 Since a cause of action for libel is personal to
supra note 4, § 113. This seems to raise the possibility that a civil libel action
might lie where publication is only to the plaintiff.
An opportunity to resolve the question arose in Jacobs v. Transcontinental
and Western Air, Inc., 205 S.W.2d 887 (K.C. Mo. App. 1947), where the appeals
court again stated that the criminal libel publication statute applied to civil ac-
tions. However, the supreme court reversed on other grounds and did not reach
the issue. 358 Mo. 674, 216 S.W.2d 523 (1948).
A federal district court has expressed the view that the Missouri Supreme
Court would, if directly confronted with the question, declare that publication to
the plaintiff alone does not give rise to a libel claim. Insurance Research Service
v. Associates Fin. Corp., 134 F. Supp. 54 (M.D. Tenn. 1955) (applying Missouri
law).
It should be noted that Missouri's new criminal code, S.B. 60, 79th Gen.
Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess., (1977), repeals § 559.430, RSMo 1969, perhaps making
it easier for a court to reaffirm the common law rule that publication to the
plaintiff alone is insufficient in civil libel cases.
19. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 113 at 767-68.
20. Hellesen v. Knaus Truck Lines, Inc., 370 S.W.2d 341 (Mo. 1963). A re-
cent case, Ramacciotti v. Zinn, 550 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977),
stressed that the communication must be in the due course of the corporate
business. The court found sufficient publication where a communication between
municipal officials was not in the course of ordinary procedures.
21. Turnbull v. Herald Co., 459 S.W.2d 516 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970); Moritz
v. Kansas City Star Co., 364 Mo. 32, 258 S.W.2d 583 (En Banc 1953); § 559.430,
RSMo 1969.
22. 355 Mo. 778, 197 S.W.2d 958 (1946).
23. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 564 (1934).
24. Skain v. Weldon, 422 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. 1967); Coats v. News Corp., 355
Mo. 778, 197 S.W.2d 958 (1946).
25. § 516.140, RSMo (Supp. 1976).
26. § 537.030, RSMo 1969.
1978]
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
the plaintiff, there can be no action for civil libel of the dead. 27 The




The elements of Missouri's criminal slander statute 2 9 have been held
inapplicable in civil slander actions.3° In Kirk v. Ebenhoch 3 1 the Missouri
Supreme Court stated the traditional common law rule for civil slander.
Defamatory words are actionable per se, i.e., without proof of special
damages, if they falsely impute: (1) unfitness for or lack of integrity in
office, trade, profession, or business; (2) commission of a crime punisha-
ble by imprisonment; (3) a loathsome, contagious disease; or (4) unchas-
tity. 3
2
If a statement falls within one of these four categories, it is slander-
ous per se and proof of either actual damages or malice is not required
27. Bello v. Random House, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1967). The court
interpreted § 559.410, RSMo 1969, a criminal libel statute which it said also
applies to civil libel actions, as not giving rise to a civil cause of action in favor of
the surviving relatives and friends for defamation of a dead person; rather, the
court said, the statute was intended to incorporate the common law rule that a
defamation action is personal to the plaintiff.
28. § 508.010(6), RSMo 1969.
29. § 559.400, RSMo 1969, provides:
Every person who shall falsely and maliciously charge or accuse any
female of incest, fornication, adultery or whoredom, by falsely speak-
ing of and concerning such female, in the presence and hearing of any
other person or persons, any false and slanderous words which shall
impute to her any such offense, or who shall in like manner falsely
and maliciously charge any person with incest, or the infamous crime
against nature, or with any felony, the commission of which would
subject such person to disfranchisement and other degrading penalties,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
The statute is repealed effective January 1, 1979 by Missouri's new criminal
code, S.B. 60, 79th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1977).
30. Krup v. Corley, 95 Mo. App. 640, 69 S.W. 609 (St. L. Ct. App. 1902).
31. 354 Mo. 762, 191 S.W.2d 643 (1945).
32. Id. at 765, 191 S.W.2d at 644. As to the meaning of special damages, see
Part II, § H infra.
Brown v. Kitterman, 443 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1969) is to the same effect as Kirk
v. Ebenhoch except that Brown refers to imputation of unchastity to a woman as
being actionable without proof of special damages. This is consistent with case
law in other states to the effect that imputing unchastity to a man is not action-
able without proof of special damages. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 112. This
would appear to be incorrect in view of § 537.110, RSMo 1969 which states: "It
is actionable to publish falsely and maliciously, in any manner whatsoever, that
any person has been guilty of fornication or adultery." Brown v. Wintsch, 110
Mo. App. 264, 84 S.W. 196 (K.C. Ct. App. 1904), stated that it is actionable per
se under this statute to charge falsely any person capable of committing the sex-
ual act with adultery or fornication.
[Vol. 43
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because the law presumes both.3 3 There is strict liability if the plaintiff
proves that words slanderous per se were spoken concerning the plain-
tiff and were heard and understood by a person or persons other than
the plaintiff.34 However, there is not strict liability if the publication was
accidental; in that event, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was
negligent as to the publication-that is, that the defendant reasonably
should have known that his words would be heard by a third party.35 In
the case of slander not per se, the plaintiff must show in addition that he
was damaged by the defamatory statement.3 6
Many of the Missouri slander per se cases deal with imputations of
crime. 37  It seems clear that the crime imputed must be one that can
result in imprisonment, either in the penitentiary or the county jail.38  If
the crime imputed would result only in a fine, there is no slander per
se. 39 There are also a number of slander per se cases dealing with false
statements tending to prejudice the plaintiff in his office, profession,
trade, business, or employment; or imputing a lack of integrity, knowl-
edge, capacity, skill, or fitness to carry out that vocation.40
C. Libel
A logical starting place in discussing Missouri libel law is the provi-
sion in the Bill of Rights of the Missouri Constitution that "in suits and
prosecutions for libel the jury, under the direction of the court, shall
33. Priest v. Central States Fire Ins. Co., 223 Mo. App. 122, 9 S.W.2d 543(Spr. Ct. App. 1928). Note that under Gertz, actual damages may not be pre-
sumed. See text accompanying notes 178-79 infra.
34. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 23.10 (1969 ed.). Note, however, that under
Gertz the defendant would have to be at least negligent as to the truth or falsity
of the defamatory statement. See note 174 and accompanying text infra.
35. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 23.10 (1969 ed.). The comments accompany-
ing this instruction indicate there are no Missouri cases on the issue of accidental
publication and cite RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 577 (1934) as authority for the
proposition that negligence is necessary for liability in such a case.
36. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 23.09 (1969 ed.).
37. See, e.g., Barnett v. Schumacher, 453 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. 1970) (forgery);
Lightfoot v. Jennings, 363 Mo. 878, 254 S.W.2d 596 (1953) ("damned com-
munist" as imputing statutory crime of advocating violent overthrow of U.S. gov-
ernment); Lonergan v. Love, 235 Mo. App. 1066, 150 S.W.2d 534 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1941) (thief); Starnes v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power Co., 331 Mo.
44, 52 S.W.2d 852 (1932) (diverting electricity); Priest v. Central States Fire Ins.
Co., 223 Mo. App. 122, 9 S.W.2d 543 (Spr. Ct. App. 1928) (defrauding insur-
ance company by arson).
38. Lightfoot v. Jennings, 363 Mo. 878, 254 S.W.2d 596 (1953); Priest v.
Central States Fire Ins. Co., 223 Mo. App. 122, 9 S.W.2d 543 (Spr. Ct. App.
1928).
39. Kirk v. Ebenhoch, 354 Mo. 762, 191 S.W.2d 643 (1945).
40. See, e.g., Williams v. School Dist., 447 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1969); Jacobs v.
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 358 Mo. 674, 216 S.W.2d 523 (1948);
Heitzeberg v. Von Hoffmann Press, 340 Mo. 265, 100 S.W.2d 307 (1937).Jacobs
and Heitzeberg also state that such imputations are libelous per se.
6
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determine the law and the facts." 4  In Jacobs v. Transcontinental &
Western Air, Inc.42 the supreme court stated that the constitutional provi-
sion stems from Fox's Libel Act,43 adopted by the English Parliament in
1792 to correct a practice that had grown up in criminal libel prosecu-
tions whereby the judge would decide whether a statement was defama-
tory and submit to the jury only issues such as proof of publication.
According to the court, Fox's Act required that "the whole case be left to
the jury, just as any other criminal case." But the act did not deprive the
judge of the power to direct the jury to acquit because the statement in
question was not defamatory as a matter of law.44 The constitutional
provision clearly applies to both civil and criminal libel actions. Thus, by
analogy to the purpose of the rule in criminal prosecutions, the court
has held that the effect is to prevent the judge from directing a verdict
for the plaintiff in a civil libel suit.45 On the other hand, it consistently
has been held that the court may dismiss a petition for failure to state a
libel claim and may direct a verdict for the defendant.4 6
From the jurors' point of view, the only difference the constitutional
provision makes is that they are told they "may," instead of "shall," find
for the plaintiff if they believe the plaintiff has proved the elements of
his case. 47 The net effect of all this would seem to be a slight bias in
favor of the defendant in a libel action, 48 which is perhaps consistent
41. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 8.
42. 358 Mo. 674, 216 S.W.2d 523 (1948).
43. 32 Geo. 3, c.60 (1792).
44. Id. at 680, 216 S.W.2d at 527.
45. E.g., Lee v. W.E. Fuetterer Battery & Supplies Co., 323 Mo. 1204, 23
S.W.2d 45 (1929); Ukman v. Daily Record Co., 189 Mo. 378, 88 S.W. 60 (1905);
Note, Selected Aspects of the Missouri Law of Defamation: A Plea for Judicial Reform,
1957 WASH. U.L.Q. 358, 374-75 and cases cited therein.
46. E.g., Missouri Church of Scientology v. Adams, 543 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. En
Banc 1976); Coots v. Payton, 365 Mo. 180, 280 S.W.2d 47 (En Banc 1955);
Jacobs v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 358 Mo. 674, 216 S.W.2d 523
(1948).
In addition, the court has held that a trial court may grant a new trial on the
ground that a verdict for the plaintiff was against the weight of the evidence.
Lupkey v. Weldon, 419 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
In Rowden v. Amick, 446 S.W.2d 849 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969), the court
noted that the United States Supreme Court has stated that the courts are duty
bound in libel cases to determine whether, under the evidence, the plaintiff has
made a submissible case.
47. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 23.06 (1969 ed.).
48. See Ukman v. Daily Record Co., 189 Mo. 378, 88 S.W. 60 (1905), stating
that:
[A] defendant in a libel suit has two strings to his bow, the one the
jury and the other the court, whereas the plaintiff has but one, and, if
he succeed, must win a verdict from the jury. Stated in a different
way, if the defendant can get either the court or the jury to be in his
favor, he succeeds, while the prosecutor or plaintiff cannot succeed
unless he gets both the court and the jury to decide for him. From this
276 [Vol. 43
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with the fact that the constitutional provision in question is part of a
section dealing with freedom of speech.
In defining civil libel the Missouri courts have turned to the state's
criminal libel statute, which is said to incorporate the common law.49
The statute defines libel as "the malicious defamation of a person ...
tending to ... expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to
deprive him of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse
.... ,5 In applying the statute, the Missouri Supreme Court has fas-
tened upon the words "malicious defamation" and held there must be a
"defamation in a libelous sense" in addition to exposing the plaintiff to
public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or depriving him of public confi-
dence and social relationships. The seminal case expressing this in-
terpretation is Diener v. Star-Chronicle Publishing Co., 51 which stated the
test for "legal defamation": "Defamation includes the idea of calumny,
aspersion by lying; the injury of another's reputation in that way. To
defame is to speak evil of one maliciously, to dishonor, to render infa-
mous." 52  By way of explanation, the court gave the example of a per-
son living in a beer and wine drinking community who is called a
teetotaler; while this might hold him up to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule, it would not be libelous because there is nothing dishonorable
or disgraceful about being a teetotaler.-- This interpretation of the
statute has been followed in numerous subsequent cases. 54 Thus the
condition of things it further follows that the court may direct a non-
suit, but cannot coerce a verdict for the plaintiff.
Id. at 390, 88 S.W. at 64 (citations omitted).
49. Langworthy v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 368 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1963); Coots
v. Payton, 365 Mo. 180, 280 S.W.2d 47 (En Banc 1955); Seested v. Post Printing
& Publishing Co., 326 Mo. 559, 31 S.W.2d 1045 (1930); Diener v. Star-Chronicle
Publishing Co., 232 Mo. 416, 135 S.W. 6 (En Banc 1911); Williams v. Gulf Coast
Collection Agency Co., 493 S.W.2d 367 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
The early cases of Skelley v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 176 Mo. App. 156, 161
S.W. 877 (Spr. Ct. App. 1913), and Kenworthy v. Journal Co., 117 Mo. App.
327, 93 S.W. 882 (K.C. Ct. App. 1906) often are cited in subsequent cases for the
proposition that what is now § 559.410, RSMo 1969, was intended to incorporate
the common law as to civil libel actions and was not intended to make publica-
tions libelous that would not have been civilly libelous at common law.
It should be noted that the criminal slander and libel statutes are repealed
by the new Missouri criminal code, S.B. 60, 79th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess.
(1977), which will take effect January 1, 1979. After that time, however, there
would be nothing to prevent the courts from applying similar rules to civil libel
cases because the criminal libel statute has been interpreted as codifying the
common law as to civil libel.
50. § 559.410, RSMo 1969. A related statute, § 559.420, RSMo 1969, makes
a criminal libel within § 559.420 a misdemeanor.
51. 232 Mo. 416, 135 S.W. 6 (En Banc 1911).
52. Id. at 433, 135 S.W. at 11.
53. Id.
54. E.g., Langworthy v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 368 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1963);
Coots v. Payton, 365 Mo. 180, 280 S.W.2d 47 (En Banc 1955); Williams v. Gulf
Coast Collection Agency Co., 493 S.W.2d 367 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
19781 277
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Missouri definition of libel appears to be consistent with cases in other
states which hold that an essential element of defamation is injury to
reputation in a disgraceful or dishonorable sense. 55
If words do not come within the statutory definition of libel, they
are not actionable. On the other hand, any language fairly included
within the statutory definition is said to be libelous per se, meaning that
the words are actionable and that the plaintiff is not required to plead or
prove damages. 56 It should be noted that in the libel context, the term
"per se" simply denotes whether words are actionable at all. This is a
different use of the term than in the slander context where "per se" is
used to denote the occasions on which a defamatory statement is action-
able without proof of special damages. 57 While slander per se and libel
per se do not have the same meanings, the kinds of statements held to
be slanderous per se are generally actionable in libel cases. 58 However,
some statements that would not be slanderous per se, i.e., statements that
would require proof of special damages in order to be actionable, have
been held libelous per se and thus actionable.5 9 Some types of state-
55. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 111 at 742.
56. See Coots v. Payton, 365 Mo. 180, 280 S.W.2d 47 (En Banc 1955);
Seested v. Post Printing and Publishing Co., 326 Mo. 559, 31 S.W.2d 1045
(1930).
Note that under Gertz the plaintiff may not recover without proving actual
damages unless the defendant knew the defamatory statement was false or pub-
lished it in reckless disregard of the truth. See notes 178-81 and accompanying
text infra.
57. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
58. Imputation of crime is libelous per se. Walker v. Kansas City Star Co.,
406 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1966); Hall v. Brookshire, 364 Mo. 779, 267 S.W.2d 627 (En
Banc 1954); Rowden v. Amick, 446 S.W. 2d 849 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
Statements tending to prejudice the plaintiff in his profession, trade, busi-
ness or office are libelous per se. Moritz v. Kansas City Star Co., 364 Mo. 32, 258
S.W.2d 583 (En Banc 1953); Kleinschmidt v. Johnson, 183 S.W.2d 82 (Mo.
1944); Conrad v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 228 Mo. App. 817, 73 S.W.2d 438
(K.C. Ct. App. 1934).
False imputations of fornication or adultery are actionable per se. § 537.110,
RSMo 1969.
59. E.g., it is libelous per se to call plaintiff a liar, but this would not be
slanderous per se. Becker v. Brinkop, 230 Mo. App. 871, 78 S.W.2d 538 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1935). The court stated: "Many things are libelous per se, when put in
writing and published, that are not slanderous per se, or at all, when spoken by
word of mouth. The kernel of the matter in these subtle distinctions lies in the
axiom: The spoken word flies; the written letter remains." Id. at 877, 78 S.W.2d
at 540 (citations omitted).
It also has been held libelous per se to state that the plaintiff was disloyal to
the United States during World War I even though the actions charged did not
constitute a crime, Seested v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 326 Mo. 559, 31
S.W.2d 1045 (1930); to state that plaintiff is "infamous," Coots v. Payton, 365
Mo. 180, 280 S.W.2d 47 (En Banc 1955); and to state that plaintiff should be
locked in a cage and exhibited to tourists because such statement implies an
illness, id.
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ments are simply not defamatory at all.60 It is clear that the mere falsity
of a statement does not make it libelous per se, provided that it is not
otherwise defamatory. 61
Certain principles of interpretation are followed by Missouri courts
in considering allegedly libelous statements. The court must look at a
published article as a whole and give its words their plain, popular, and
ordinary meanings. 62 In the case of an article with a headline, the arti-
cle and the headline are considered as one document in determining
whether the overall effect is defamatory and, if so, of whom.63
If it is found that the defendant published a libel per se concerning
the plaintiff to a third person or persons, there is a strict liability unless
there is a successful defense.64 Again, however, as in the case of slan-
der, if the publication was accidental, then the defendant must be at
least negligent as to the act of publication. 65
There remains to be discussed the curious doctrine of libel per
quod, which is analogous to slander not per se in that it requires a
showing of special damages. Libel per quod exists where extrinsic facts
must be pleaded to show the defamatory meaning of the libel. Most
states treat libel per quod like slander; that is, if the imputation falls into
one of the slander per se categories, it is actionable without proof of
special damages, but if it is not within one of those categories, special
damage must be pleaded and proved. In any event, the extrinsic facts
necessary to make out the defamatory meaning must be pleaded and
proved. 6 6 The Missouri approach to libel per quod is significantly
different, however, in that it requires the pleading and proving of ex-
60. E.g., it has been held not libelous per se to state that plaintiff has failed
to pay a debt, at least in the absence of imputations that plaintiff failed to pay
due to unreliability, inability to perform a contract or service, or insolvency,
Coonis v. Rogers, 429 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. 1968); that a clergyman is guilty of
heresy, Creekmore v. Runnels, 359 Mo. 1020, 224 S.W.2d 1007 (1949); that a
state senator changed his mind and decided to vote for a United States Senate
candidate for whom he earlier said he could not vote, even though the plaintiff
alleged the implication was that he had been bribed, Branch v. Publishers:
George Knapp & Co., 222 Mo. 580, 121 S.W. 93 (1909); or that plaintiff owes a
debt, Williams v. Gulf Coast Collection Agency Co., 493 S.W.2d 367 (Mo. App.,
D. St. L. 1973).
61. Langworthy v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 368 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1963); Davis
v. Missourian Publishing Ass'n, 323 Mo. 695, 19 S.W.2d 650 (1929).
62. Thomson v. Kansas City Star Co., 387 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1965); Jacobs v.
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 358 Mo. 674, 216 S.W.2d 523 (1948);
Seested v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 326 Mo. 559, 31 S.W.2d 1045 (1930).
63. Hylsky v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 348 Mo. 83, 152 S.W.2d 119
(1941).
64. Mo. APPROVED INsTR. No. 23.06 (1969 ed.). It should be noted that under
Gertz most if not all plaintiffs will have to show the defendant was at least negli-
gent. See Part III, § C infra.
65. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 23.06 (1969 ed.).
66. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 112 at 763.
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trinsic facts and special damages in all cases where the published words
are not libelous per se on the face of the publication. 7 The Missouri
Supreme Court has justified its rule as follows:
When the published words do not constitute libel per se the law
does not presume that at least some damage resulted, but
"special damages constitute the sole basis for a recovery." ... If
a plaintiff must plead extrinsic facts to show he has been
libeled, he should also plead facts to show his damage. 68
If extrinsic facts are pleaded in a per quod case but special damages are
not, the court will ignore the extrinsic facts in determining whether the
publication is libelous. 69 Where extrinsic facts and special damages
should have been pleaded but are not, no cause of action is stated and
the statute of limitations is not tolled; thus the petition cannot be
amended to state a cause of libel per quod after two years from the date
of publication.70 The nature of special damages is discussed else-
where.71
D. Truth Defense
The Missouri Constitution provides that in suits and prosecutions
for libel and slander "the truth thereof may be given in evidence
.... "72 The revised statutes also provide that truth "shall constitute a
complete defense .... ",73 Numerous cases have held that truth is an
absolute defense to defamation, whether libel or slander.74 Because the
truth of an allegedly defamatory statement is an affirmative defense, it
must be pleaded and proved by the defendant,75 such proof to be by a
preponderance of the evidence.76 However, it is not necessary that the
67. Langworthy v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 368 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1963). Ac-
cord, Brown v. Kitterman, 443 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1969); Dietrich v. Pulitzer Pub-
lishing Co., 422 S.W.2d 330 (Mo. 1968); Otto v. Kansas City Star Co., 368
S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1963); Williams v. Gulf Coast Collection Agency Co., 493
S.W.2d 367 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
In Langworthy the plaintiff pleaded extrinsic facts to show that the alleged
defamation tended to prejudice him in his profession as a lawyer, which would
fall within one of the traditional slander per se categories, but the court held the
petition was insufficient because of failure to allege special damages.
68. Brown v. Kitterman, 443 S.W.2d 146, 152-53 (Mo. 1969) (citation omit-
ted).
69. Langworthy v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 368 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Mo. 1963).
70. Otto v. Kansas City Star Co., 368 S.W.2d 494, 497-98 (Mo. 1963).
71. See Part II, § H infra.
72. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 8.
73. § 559.440, RSMo 1969.
74. E.g., Hall v. Brookshire, 364 Mo. 774, 267 S.W.2d 627 (En Banc 1954)
(slander); Moritz v. Kansas City Star Co., 364 Mo. 32, 258 S.W.2d 583 (En Banc
1953) (libel). See also Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 32.12 (1969 ed.).
75. Walker v. Kansas City Star Co., 406 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1966); § 509.090,
RSMo 1969.
76. Hall v. Brookshire, 364 Mo. 774, 267 S.W.2d 627 (En Banc 1954). This is
so even where the imputation was that plaintiff was guilty of a crime. Id. at 632.
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defendant prove the defamatory statement was true in every particular.
"Slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial if the defamatory
charge is true in substance."7 7 The falsity of a defamatory publication
is presumed and need not be pleaded by the plaintiff.78 However, the
plaintiff may offer affirmative evidence of falsity. 9 It is permissible for
the defendant to plead truth and qualified privilege in the alternative.
8 0
E. Absolute Privilege
Certain occasions which might give rise to defamatory statements
are recognized as absolutely privileged on the principle that
it is indispensable, or at least advantageous, to the public inter-
est that persons should speak freely and fearlessly, uninflu-
enced by the possibility of being brought to account in an ac-
tion for defamation .... Absolute privilege has been conceded
on obvious grounds of public policy to ensure freedom of
speech where it is essential that freedom of speech should
exist.8 '
Judicial proceedings commonly are held to constitute an absolutely
privileged occasion during which any of the participants, whether judge,
party, attorney, or witness, may utter defamatory matter relevant to the
subject of the proceeding without civil liability for defamation.82 How-
ever, a third party who has procured the utterance of a defamation by a
protected party in the judicial proceeding cannot claim the absolute
privilege.8 3 There is dictum to the effect that a similar absolute
privilege applies to legislative proceedings, certain executive proceedings,
and to publications between husband and wife of defamatory matter re-
garding third persons.8 4 In addition, the Missouri Supreme Court re-
cently has held that publications made with the consent of the plaintiff
77. Kleinschmidt v. Johnson, 183 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Mo. 1944). Accord, Turnbull
v. Herald Co., 459 S.W.2d 516 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970). See also Mo. APPROVED
INSTR. No. 32.12 (1969 ed.): "Your verdict must be for defendant if you believe
that the statement ... was substantially true."
78. Walker v. Kansas City Star Co., 406 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1966). However, as a
practical matter, Gertz may require the plaintiff to show falsity. See Part V, § C
supra-.
79. Hall v. Brookshire, 367 Mo. 774, 267 S.W.2d 627 (En Banc 1954);
Seested v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 326 Mo. 559, 31 S.W.2d 1045 (1930).
80. Trice v. Lancaster, 270 S.W.2d 519 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954). As to the role
of truth in relation to qualified privileges, see Part II, § F infra.
81. Laun v. Union Elec. Co., 350 Mo. 572, 577-78, 166 S.W.2d 1065, 1068
(1942).
82. Id.; Wright v. Truman Road Enterprises, 443 S.W.2d 13 (K.C. Mo. App.
1969). For a more detailed discussion of absolute privilege in judicial proceed-
ings, see Turley, Defamation -Attorney's Power, Attorney's Nemesis, 35 Mo. L. REv.
130, 135 (1970) and cases cited therein..
83. Laun v. Union Elec. Co., 350 Mo. 572, 582, 166 S.W.2d 1065, 1072
(1942).
84. Id. at 578, 166 S.W.2d at 1069.
1978]
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are absolutely privileged.8 5  While there is a growing trend in other
states to expand the number of occasions protected by an absolute
privilege, 6 the tendency in Missouri is to confine absolute privilege to
the relatively small number of occasions stated in this section.8 7
There are two miscellaneous absolute privileges provided by statute.
Information submitted to the state division of employment security pur-
suant to the Missouri Employment Security Law cannot be the basis for a
libel or slander action.88 In addition, broadcasters cannot be liable for
defamatory statements uttered via radio or television by a candidate for
public office where the statements are not subject to the censorship or
control of the broadcaster by reason of any federal statute or ruling or
order of the Federal Communications Commission. 9
F. Qualified Privilege
If defamatory statements are made on a qualifiedly privileged occa-
sion, the defendant will not be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the
defendant acted with malice.9 0 The fact that there may be a qualified
privilege cannot be determinative on a motion to dismiss for failure to
85. Williams v. School Dist., 447 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1969) (plaintiff teacher
asked at a school board meeting why she was not being rehired and the school
superintendent replied that she had disobeyed school rules and regulations, was
insubordinate, and was insufficient and inadequate with her students).
In two earlier cases, Pulliam y. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1966) and Helle-
sen v. Knaus Truck Lines, Inc., 370 S.W.2d 341 (Mo. 1963), the court estab-
lished that consent by the plaintiff would give rise to a privilege; however, the
court did not decide whether the privilege was qualified or absolute because
there was no evidence of malice that would overcome a qualified privilege. See
Part II, § G infra as to abuse of qualified privilege.
86. Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d 492 (1969).
87. Ramacciotti v. Zinn, 550 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977). The
court refused to extend an absolute privilege to a memorandum written by the
defendant police chief that was critical of the plaintiff patrolman in connection
with disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff. The court noted that while
there might have been an absolute privilege for statements made by the defen-
dant in the course of an actual disciplinary hearing provided for under the city's
rules, the privilege could not extend to the memorandum which was published
out of the ordinary course of disciplinary proceedings. The court justified the
difference in treatment of the two situations on the grounds that during a hear-
ing the testimony would be under the control of an independent hearing officer
and there would be an opportunity for both sides to explore the truth of the
statements. Id. at 224.
88. § 288.250, RSMo 1969.
89. § 537.105, RSMo 1969. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 114 at
785.
90. Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1966); Finley v. Steele, 159 Mo.
299, 60 S.W. 108 (1900). Technically, malice is an element of the plaintiff's case,
but it is presumed unless there is a conditional privilege, in which event the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove malice. Id. at 305-06, 60 S.W. at 109. See
also Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 23.06, Committee's Comment (1969 ed.) and cases
282 [Vol. 43
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state a claim because the plaintiff may be able to prove abuse of the
privilege.91 While qualified privilege is a defense and generally should
be pleaded and proved by the defendant, the privilege may be estab-
lished by the plaintiff's pleadings and evidence even if the defendant
fails to raise the issue.92 Whether a qualified privilege exists is a ques-
tion of law for the court; whether the defendant abused the privilege is
an issue of fact for the jury.93
The Missouri courts have tended to define qualified privilege in
rather broad terms, thus making it relatively easy for defendants to use
the defense. This may account for the large number of cases dealing
with qualified privilege.94 The following is a typical definition:
[B]efore the defense of qualified privilege is available it must
appear that the statements made by the defendant were made
in the discharge of some duty, either public or private, either
legal, moral, or social, to a person or persons having a corres-
ponding interest or duty, and were spoken in connection with
and were relevant and germane to some matter involving such
an interest or duty, and that the words were spoken in the
interest of or for the protection thereof .... 95
Despite this broad definition, the cases tend to fall into certain recogniz-
able factual patterns. A number of cases do involve what the court per-
ceives as a "common interest" of the defendant and the person or per-
sons to whom the defamatory statement is published. 6 A form of
cited therein. As to the character of the "malice" that will overcome a qualified
privilege, see Part II, § G infra.
91. Coots v. Payton, 365 Mo. 180, 280 S.W.2d 47 (En Banc 1955).
92. Cash v. Empire Gas Corp., 547 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
93. Estes v. Lawton-Byrne-Bruner Ins. Agency Co., 437 S.W.2d 685 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1969).
94. See Manning v. McAllister, 454 S.W.2d 597 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970) and
cases cited therein.
95. Id. at 600.
96. Manning v. McAllister, 454 S.W.2d 597 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970) (qualified
privilege found where defendant police chief told plaintiff's relatives that plain-
tiff was discharged as a policeman for associating with felons); Estes v. Lawton-
Byrne-Bruner Ins. Agency Co., 437 S.W.2d 685 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969) (de-
fendant insurance agency's incorrect notification to policyholder that plaintiff
insurance agent had not forwarded a premium payment held qualifiedly
privileged); Trice v. Lancaster, 270 S.W.2d 519 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954) (state-
ments by branch manager of insurance agency to policyholders concerning pre-
mium collections supposed to have been made by plaintiff held qualifiedly
privileged).
Occasionally the common interest privilege is found where the third persons
receiving the communication would seem to have a very slight interest, if any.
Compare, e.g., Gust v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 229 Mo. App. 371, 80 S.W.2d
286 (Spr. Ct. App. 1935) (defendant's store clerk followed plaintiff onto sidewalk
and in presence of plaintiff's companions and numerous passersby accused
plaintiff of shoplifting) with Lonergan v. Love, 235 Mo. App. 1066, 150 S.W.2d
534 (St. L. Ct. App. 1941) (no qualified privilege where defendant accused
plaintiff of stealing corn in presence of a neighbor).
1978] 283
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common interest privilege also has been found in cases involving com-
munications among members of churches, lodges, societies, labor unions,
and other groups. 97 A few cases suggest that self-defense may give rise
to a qualified privilege if the defamatory statement is in response to the
statement against which it defends.98 Qualified privilege also has been
found where the defendant had a legal or moral duty to speak. 9
Qualified privilege has been found in several cases where a news-
paper was the defendant. Privilege attaches to published reports on judi-
cial proceedings so long as the reports are fair and reasonably
correct.10 0 An early case extended a similar privilege to a governor's
97. Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1966) (arguably dictum in this
case since court also held plaintiff's consent gave rise to a privilege); Warren v.
Pulitzer Publishing Co., 336 Mo. 184, 78 S.W.2d 404 (1934) (church disciplinary
proceedings).
In such cases, for the qualified privilege to arise the communication must be
made to the appropriate sub-group within a larger organization if it is the sub-
group that has the power to take action on the matter. Fisher v. Myers, 339 Mo.
1196, 100 S.W.2d 551 (1936).
98. Hall v. Brookshire, 285 S.W.2d 60 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955); Fish v. St.
Louis County Printing & Publishing Co., 102 Mo. App. 6, 74 S.W. 641 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1903). Cf. Bernhardt v. Armbruster, 217 S.W.2d 759 (St. L. Mo. App.
1949) (qualified privilege found where election clerk executed affidavit for pro-
secutor concerning election irregularities involving plaintiff election supervisor).
99. Williams v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 339 S.W.2d 792 (Mo. 1960) (qual-
ified privilege found where corporation defamed former employee in statutorily
required service letter); Boehm v. Western Leather Clothing Co., 161 S.W.2d
710 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942) (qualified privilege under labor contract for presi-
dent of company to complain about plaintiff employee to employees' shop com-
mittee); Lee v. W.E. Fuetterer Battery & Supplies Co., 323 Mo. 1204, 23 S.W.2d
45 (1929) (qualified privilege based on moral duty to public where defendant
complained to bar association about plaintiff attorney).
100. Jones v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 240 Mo. 200, 144 S.W. 441 (1911). The
policy behind this privilege is that it is considered in the public interest that the
public be informed of judicial proceedings. Id. Even if a court's judgment is
erroneous, an accurate report of it is privileged and the publisher is under no
obligation to go behind the judgment and make an independent investigation of
its correctness. Grossman v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 347 Mo. 869, 149
S.W.2d 362 (1941). Likewise, if the publisher does not have actual knowledge of
the falsity of a statement made during the course of a judicial proceeding, he
may publish a report of the statement without making an investigation of his
own. Spradlin's Market, Inc., v. Springfield Newspapers, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 859
(Mo. 1966). If the publisher does undertake to state additional matters based
upon his own investigation, such matters are not privileged. Id.
An early opinion extended this qualified privilege to published reports of
pleadings and depositions filed in a divorce suit in advance of a trial on the
merits, apparently on the theory that the papers came within the privilege once
there was a preliminary hearing on a plea in abatement. Jones v. Pulitzer Pub-
lishing Co., 240 Mo. 200, 144 S.W. 441 (1911). But it is unclear in Missouri to
what extent the privilege applies to pleadings and other documents filed in cases
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extradition hearing on the ground that it was quasi-judicial in nature;
dictum suggested that the privilege also would be extended to legislative
and executive proceedings and investigations.' 0 ' Missouri cases also
have recognized a qualified privilege for newspaper reports concerning
public documents and reasons given for official government actions.'
0 2
An important application of this type of privilege is a qualified privilege
for news reports based on official police reports concerning arrests
where the report is fair and substantially accurate.10 3  A final area of
qualified privilege for news media defendants involves commentary on
the actions of public officials relating to matters of public interest.'
0 4
In determining whether a report of a judicial proceeding is reasonably cor-
rect, it should be viewed from the standpoint of reporters whose job it is to
prepare such reports for the news media and not from the standpoint of a pro-
fessional court reporter or a trained lawyer. Spradlin's Market, Inc., v.
Springfield Newspapers, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1966).
It should be noted that this privilege area has been taken over to a large
extent by constitutional privilege. See Part III, § A infra.
101. Brown v. Globe Printing Co., 213 Mo. 611, 112 S.W. 462 (1908).
102. In one case concerning reports of poor conditions in a children's deten-
tion home, the court found the privilege apparently to be based upon the fact
that there had been grand jury reports concerning the matter. Merriam v. Star-
Chronicle Publishing Co., 335 Mo. 937, 74 S.W.2d 592 (1934). The privilege also
was found where defendant newspaper published a story concerning an official
audit report about irregularities in city council appropriations. Davis v. Missou-
rian Publishing Ass'n, Inc., 323 Mo. 695, 19 S.W.2d 650 (1929).
103. Moritz v. Kansas City Star Co., 364 Mo. 32, 258 S.W.2d 583 (En Banc
1953); Turnbull v. Herald Co., 459 S.W.2d 516 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970). As with
the privilege of reporting on judicial proceedings, however, if the publisher un-
dertakes to state additional matters based on his own investigation, he does so at
his peril because the additional matters are not privileged. Id.
104. The acts of a public officer are open to fair and just criticism and com-
ment, Branch v. Publishers: George Knapp & Co., 222 Mo. 580, 121 S.W. 93
(1909); but the privilege does not extend to false factual assertions, Conrad v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 228 Mo. App. 817, 73 S.W.2d 438 (K.C. Ct. App.
1934). The privilege has been extended to quasi-public officials such as the
chairman of a state political committee. Cook v. Globe Printing Co., 227 Mo.
471, 127 S.W. 332 (En Banc 1910). Some cases indicate the privilege applies to
discussion of any matter of public interest, id.; Cook v. Pulitzer Publishing Co.,
241 Mo. 326, 145 S.W. 480 (1912), but this appears to be dicta since the cases
involved officials. Indeed, later cases phrase the rule in terms of commentary
upon public officials relating to a matter of public interest. State ex rel. Zorn v.
Cox, 318 Mo. 112, 298 S.W. 837 (1927); McClung v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 279
Mo. 370, 214 S.W. 193 (En Banc 1919).
The privilege also extends to publications regarding candidates for public
office. Kleinschmidt v. Bell, 353 Mo. 516, 183 S.W.2d 87 (1944); Walsh v.
Pulitzer Publishing Co., 250 Mo. 142, 157 S.W. 326 (1913).
Once again, it should be noted that this privilege area has been taken over
by the constitutional privilege as to public officials and, to some extent, as 'to
matters of public interest. See Part III, §§ A, B infra.
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G. Abuse of Qualified Privilege
In general the Missouri cases have held that the plaintiff may over-
come a defense of qualified privilege by proving that the defendant
published the defamatory statement with malice.10 5 Whether such
malice exists is a jury question, 106 and the plaintiff has the burden of
proof on the issue." 7 Malice generally can be shown by evidence that
the defendant published defamatory matter for a motive inconsistent
with the principles giving rise to the privilege.10 Malice also can be
shown by the defendant's spite or ill will toward the plaintiff or by an
improper motive implying a desire to injure the plaintiff. However, per-
sonal hostility is not essential to a finding of malice; it also could be
found based on a wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights and interests,
or the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or ex-
cuse.
1 09
Proof of malice need not be by direct evidence of the defendant's
motives or feelings, but may be inferred from the relation of the parties,
the circumstances surrounding the defamatory publication, and even
from the terms of the defamatory statement itself.110 Perhaps the
strongest evidence of malice is proof of the falsity of the defamatory
statement and the defendant's knowledge of such falsity.' Malice also
is shown by intemperate, extravagant, and reckless language which ex-
ceeds the necessities of the situation.1 ' Although the Missouri cases
have not focused on excessive publication as evidence of malice, at least
105. Perdue v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 341 Mo. 252, 107 S.W.2d 12 (1937);
Merriam v. Star-Chronicle Publishing Co., 335 Mo. 937, 74 S.W.2d 592 (1934);
Estes v. Lawton-Byrne-Bruner Ins. Agency Co., 437 S.W.2d 685 (St. L. Mo. App.
1969).
106. Cases cited note 105 supra.
107. Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635, 641 (Mo. 1966).
108. Ramacciotti v. Zinn, 550 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); Boehm
v. Western Leather Clothing Co., 161 S.W.2d 710 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942).
109. Trice v. Lancaster, 270 S.W.2d 519 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954); Boehm v.
Western Leather Clothing Co., 161 S.W.2d 710 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942); Conrad
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 228 Mo. App. 817, 73 S.W.2d 438 (K.C. Ct. App.
1934).
110. Lazier v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 467 S.W.2d 900 (Mo. 1971); Boehm v.
Western Leather Clothing Co., 161 S.W.2d 710 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942); Conrad
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 228 Mo. App. 817, 73 S.W.2d 438 (K.C. Ct. App.
1934).
111. Warren v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 336 Mo. 184, 78 S.W.2d 404 (1934);
Estes v. Lawton-Byrne-Bruner Ins. Agency Co., 437 S.W.2d 685 (St. L. Mo. App.
1969); Boehm v. Western Leather Clothing Co., 161 S.W.2d 710 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1942).
112. Boehm v. Western Leather Clothing Co., 161 S.W.2d 710 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1942); Conrad v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 228 Mo. App. 817, 73 S.W.2d
438 (K.C. Ct. App. 1934).
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two cases have implied that a showing of excessive publication would
vitiate a qualified privilege."13
While it is clear that a showing of the defendant's knowledge of the
falsity of his defamatory statement will overcome a qualified privilege, it
is uncertain in Missouri whether negligence as to truth or falsity will
destroy the privilege or whether recklessness must be shown. A recent
supreme court case indicated that negligence might be sufficient to vit-
iate a privilege." 4 However, a subsequent St. Louis Court of Appeals
decision specifically held that mere negligence as to truth or falsity
would not destroy the privilege." 5 To further confuse the situation, a
still more recent decision of the St. Louis District of the Missouri Court
of Appeals, stated that the Missouri Approved Jury Instruction for sub-
mitting the issue of qualified privilege appears to allow a finding of
abuse of the privilege by negligence. 1 6 With this unsettled state of af-
113. Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1966); Fisher v. Myers, 339 Mo.
1196, 100 S.W.2d 551 (1936). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 115 at
793-94.
114. Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1966). The court quoted from 53
C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 99, at 156 (1948): "[i]t is generally held that if the
communication is a privileged one, made in good faith, without malice, under
probable cause to believe it to be true, and without negligence, the falsity of the com-
munication does not destroy the privilege." (emphasis added).
115. Estes v. Lawton-Byrne-Bruner Ins. Agency Co., 437 S.W.2d 685 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1969). The defendant insurance agency negligently sent a policy can-
cellation notice to a policyholder erroneously stating that the policy was cancelled
for nonpayment of the premium when in fact the premium had been paid by
the policyholder to the plaintiff agent, who had relayed the payment to the de-
fendant. In fact, the policy was cancelled under the terms of the contract because
the insuring companies no longer wished to carry the risk.
The court noted the implication in Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635 (Mo.
1966), that negligence might be sufficient to destroy a qualified privilege. How-
ever, the court pointed out that the footnotes to the statement from C.J.S.
quoted in Pulliam did not cite any Missouri cases and that no Missouri case had
held specifically that negligence alone could overcome a privilege. In any event,
the court said, the statement in Pulliam was arguably dictum since Pulliam in-
volved intentional statements.
Thus, the court concluded:
[N]egligence alone does not constitute the willfulness, or the reckless-
ness, or the wanton disregard of the rights of others required for ac-
tual or express malice. Negligence does not imply the actual presence
of an improper motive indicating a purpose or desire to injure ....
We thus hold that mere negligence alone is not sufficient to establish
the actual and express malice which is required to overcome or destroy
a qualified privilege.
116. Ramacciotti v. Zinn, 550 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977). After
quoting the language used in Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 23.06 to submit the
issue of qualified privilege ("that such statement was written knowing it to be
false or without knowledge whether it was true or false in reckless disregard for
the plaintiff's rights"), the court stated that this language "might be read as in-
viting a verdict for plaintiff based on defendant's mere negligence .... 550
18
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fairs, it is unclear whether the qualified privilege will retain its vitality in
Missouri in cases where Gertz is applied. In order to impose liability,
Gertz requires, at a minimum, proof that the defendant was negligent as
to the truth of the allegedly defamatory statement. Thus, if a qualified
privilege is vitiated by mere negligence, Gertz renders the privilege ir-
relevant because negligence will have to be proved in any event. How-
ever, if the privilege can be vitiated only by recklessness, it will retain its
vitality; even though the plaintiff might show the negligence required by
Gertz, he could not recover unless he went further and showed the reck-
lessness necessary to overcome the privilege.' 17
It is also unclear whether the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions
language for submitting the qualified privilege issue18 is intended to
incorporate all of the common law methods of destroying a privilege. 119
The language incorporates two of the principles set forth in the cases,
i.e., malice shown by defendant's knowledge of the falsity of the state-
ment and malice shown by defendant's reckless disregard of plaintiff's
rights. But on its face the language does not refer to either malice in the
sense of spite or ill will, or a motive inconsistent with the purposes of the
privilege, or so-called "legal malice" in the sense of intentionally doing a
wrongful act without just cause or excuse. If the plaintiff concludes that
the approved instruction is intended to subsume all the forms of malice,
he runs the risk of having his verdict reversed if an appellate court de-
cides the instruction should have been modified to fit the case. On the
other hand, if the plaintiff concludes the approved instruction should be
modified to fit his case and the appellate court decides the approved
instruction includes all the forms of malice, the plaintiff again would
lose. Potter v. Milbank Mfg. Co.,120 one of the few cases to discuss the
approved instruction language, did little to resolve the question because
the court found that the facts in that case fit literally within the ap-
proved language.
It is clear that a qualified privilege will not protect a defamatory
publication which includes statements not protected by the privilege. For
instance, while newspaper reports based on official police reports are
privileged, if the newspaper includes additional statements based on its
own investigation, the additional facts are not covered by the
privilege.12 1
S.W.2d at 226. The court's statement arguably was dictum, however, because the
main point of the decision was that the qualified privilege language is
inappropriate to submit the issue of "actual malice" in the case of a public offi-
cial. See Part III, § A.1 infra.
117. See Part V infra.
118. See note 116 supra.
119. See notes 108-13 and accompanying text supra.
120. 489 S.W.2d 197 (Mo. 1972).
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H. Damages1 22
Where defamation is libelous or slanderous per se, actual damages
are presumed, and, insofar as possible, they are to be compensatory for
only those injuries actually suffered. 12 3 The defendant may introduce
evidence to show that plaintiff was not injured.12 4 Where the defama-
tion is actionable per se, mental suffering resulting from the publication
of the words (not including suffering arising from the defamatory words
themselves) may be recovered as general damages. 125 The question of
such damages is said to be peculiarly within the jury's province and the
court will not overturn an award unless "the damages are so unconscion-
able as to impress the court with its injustice .... "1126 An award of
nominal damages may be appropriate to allow the plaintiff to redeem his
reputation in a case where the actual damages, if any, are slight. 127
The amount of punitive damages lies wholly within the discretion of
the jury, and the court will not interfere unless it clearly appears that the
jury has abused its discretion.12 8 Punitive damages are allowed upon a
finding that the defendant's conduct was "willful, wanton or mali-
cious." 129
Special damages for the purpose of pleading slander not per se and
libel per quod are pecuniary losses and consist of such things as a lost
contract, sale, or other valuable item; they must be pleaded with par-
ticularity.1 30 In the absence of a statute allowing recovery of attorney's
122. It should be noted that the law as to damages for defamation has been
changed substantially by Gertz. The rules stated in this section are the pre-Gertz
common law rules as developed in Missouri cases.
123. Perdue v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 341 Mo. 252, 107 S.W.2d 12 (1937);
Seested v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 326 Mo. 559, 31 S.W.2d 1045 (1930).
124. Dyer v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 378 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. 1964).
125. Perdue v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 341 Mo. 252, 107 S.W.2d 12 (1937);
Anderson v. Shockley, 159 Mo. App. 334, 140 S.W. 755 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911).
126. Lonergan v. Love, 235 Mo. App. 1066, 1074, 150 S.W.2d 534, 539 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1941). Accord, Coats v. News Corp., 355 Mo. 778, 197 S.W.2d 958
(1946).
127. See Coats v. News Corp., 355 Mo. 778, 197 S.W.2d 958 (1946).
128. Seested v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 326 Mo. 559, 31 S.W.2d 1045
(1930).
129. Potter v. Milbank Mfg. Co., 489 S.W.2d 197 (Mo. 1972); Delcour v. Wil-
son, 241 Mo. App. 951, 245 S.W.2d 467 (Spr. Ct. App. 1952). In Potter the court
approved the plaintiff's punitive damage instruction which combined Mo. AP-
PROVED INSTR. No. 10.01 on punitive damages for willful, wanton or malicious
conduct with Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 16.01 defining malice. The malice def-
inition states that malice "does not mean hatred, spite or ill will, as commonly
understood, but means the doing of a wrongful act intentionally without just
cause or excuse." However, in a discussion accompanying its consideration of the
instruction, the court implied that ill will or spite also could give rise to punitive
damages for libel. Potter v. Milbank Mfg. Co., 489 S.W.2d it 204-05.
130. Williams v. Gulf Coast Collection Agency Co., 493 S.W.2d 367 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1973). But cf. Note, Selected Aspects of the Missouri Law of Defama-
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fees in such a case, the plaintiff cannot bootstrap himself into a cause of
libel per quod by pleading attorney's fees relating to the defamatory
matter as his only special damage. 131
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
A. Prior to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
1. United States Supreme Court Cases
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 132 the defendant newspaper pub-
lished a political advertisement which endorsed civil rights demonstra-
tions by black students in Alabama and which impliedly criticized the
performance of local law-enforcement officials. In state court, the plain-
tiff police commissioner established that the advertisement contained
several, misstatements which referred to him and which were libelous per
se under Alabama law. Neither good faith nor reasonable care protected
the publisher from liability under Alabama law, thus leaving the Times
with the single defense of truth. The United States Supreme Court con-
cluded that a "rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee
the truth of all his factual assertions" would deter free speech protected
by the first amendment. 133 The Court announced a constitutional
privilege intended to counter that effect:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal
rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct un-
less he proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or not.134
In New York Times it was held not to be reckless disregard of the truth
where the newspaper had failed to check the accuracy of the advertise-
ment against news stories contained in its own files.135
The meaning of the "actual malice" required to overcome this con-
stitutional privilege was made clearer in subsequent cases. St. Amant v.
Thompson held that, without more, the mere failure to investigate does
not establish reckless disregard for the truth. The court equated reckless
disregard of the truth with the defendant's subjective awareness of prob-
able falsity: "There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of
tion: A Plea for Judicial Reform, 1957 WASH. U.L.Q. 358, 370-71, and cases cited
therein.
131. Williams v. Gulf Coast Collection Agency Co., 493 S.W.2d 367 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1973).
132. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
133. Id. at 279.
134. Id. at 279-80.
135. Id. at 287-88.
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his publication ... " and the defendant must act with a "high degree of
awareness of... probable falsity." 13 6 Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks
held that the "actual malice" test did not involve the traditional common
law malice elements of ill will or spite.' Garrison v. Louisiana made it
clear that the New York Times standard applied to criminal libel prosecu-
dons as well as civil actions and that the standard governed criticism
directed at "anything which might touch on an official's fitness for of-
fice." 138 Rosenblatt v. Baer held that the designation as a public official
"applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial respon-
sibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs."1 39
The New York Times standard was extended to public figures in Cur-
tis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker.1 40  In these com-
panion cases, "public figures" were defined as persons who are "inti-
mately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by
reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at
large." 141
136. 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (plaintiff was a deputy sheriff).
137. 389 U.S. 81 (1968) (criticism of county clerks).
138. 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (criticism of judges).
139. 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (plaintiff was the former supervisor of county ski
recreation area).
Other Supreme Court cases where plaintiffs were found to be public officials
include Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971) (mayor); Time,
Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971) (deputy chief of detectives); Henry v. Collins,
380 U.S. 356 (1965) (county attorney and chief of police).
The Supreme Court cases have focused on defamatory statements about
public officials in their public capacity, so it would seem possible that a defama-
tory statement relating to a public official in his purely private capacity might be
actionable without proof of New York Times malice. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 580A, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975), suggests the result
should depend on the nature of the office and its responsibilities weighed against
the nature of the private conduct and its bearing on fitness for office, giving this
example: "Thus a statement that the governor drinks himself into a drunken
stupor at home every night much more clearly affects his qualifications than a
statement that a tax assessor keeps a secret collection of pornographic pictures."
At least two state cases have found that the New York Times standard is inappro-
priate where a defamatory statement involves the private life of a public official:
Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964) (policeman libeled as to
acts at private fraternity gathering); Aku v. Lewis, 52 Haw. 366, 477 P.2d 162
(1970) (policeman libeled as to his private fund-raising activities for a boys' ath-
letic team).
140. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The plurality opinion by Justice Harlan said the
standard of liability in cases involving public figures should be "highly unreason-
able conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investiga-
tion and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at 155.
However, five Justices adhered to the New York Times standard of actual malice.
As to the definition of "public figure," see Part III, § C infra.
141. 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result).
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In 1971 the plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.' 42 extended
the New York Times rule to cases involving private plaintiffs where the
defamatory falsehood concerns matters of public or general interest,
reasoning that "[Ilf a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it
cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is
involved, or because in some sense the individual did not 'voluntarily'
choose to become involved." 
1 43
Also in 1971 the Court clearly indicated in Time, Inc. v. Pape that the
New York Times standard would apply to reports of public proceed-
ings.144 Subsequently, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, a nondefama-
tion case involving the closely related tort of invasion of privacy, the
Court held that the Constitution requires an absolute privilege for publi-
cation of truthful information contained in public court records open to
public inspection. 145 These holdings were limited, however, in Time, Inc.
v. Firestone, which appeared to require substantial accuracy in reports of
judicial proceedings. 146  The Firestone rule is the same as the common
law rule in Missouri.' 47
2. Missouri Cases
Relatively few Missouri cases have dealt with New York Times and its
progeny. Apparently the first to do so was Walker v. Kansas City Star
Co.,148 one of a series of suits including that which led to the U.S. Su-
preme Court's decision in Associated Press v. Walker.149 In the Missouri
case, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's petition was
sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
even if the plaintiff was subject to the New York Times rule since the
plaintiff had pleaded sufficient facts to put the question of "actual
malice" in issue.1 50 In Skain v. Weldon the Missouri court held that the
issue of "actual malice" in the New York Times sense is a jury question and
cannot be declared by the court as a matter of law. 15 '
An interesting case applying the New York Times standard to a minor
public official is Rowden v. Amick. 15 2 The defendant, a private indi-
142. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
143. Id. at 43.
144. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
145. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
146. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
147. See Part II, § F supra.
148. 406 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1966).
149. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See notes 140-41 and accompanying text supra.
150. 406 S.W.2d at 56.
151. 422 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. 1967).
152. 446 S.W.2d 849 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969). In holding that the plaintiff was a
public official for New York Times purposes, the court stated:
Of course, he was not a President, a governor, mayor of a metropoli-
tan city, or even a deputy sheriff. He was not a candidate for any of
[Vol. 43
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vidual, accused the plaintiff of perjury and sought his removal as Lake
Tapawingo deputy marshall. The court stated that the defendant ad-
mitted malice in the sense of seeking the plaintiff's removal from office,
but that this did not constitute "actual malice" in the sense of knowledge
of the falsity of the defamatory statement or reckless disregard of its
truth or falsity. 153 The court also stated that an instruction that the jury
could find for the plaintiff if the defendant acted "with reckless disre-
gard of plaintiff's rights, and with intent to damage the plaintiff" was
incorrect because these elements are not part of the New York Times
test. 154
The New York Times test was applied to another minor public official,
the director of a county detention facility, in Whitmore v. Kansas City Star
Co. 1 5 5  The court stated that in first amendment cases "constitutional
facts," in the sense of facts determinative of whether the New York Times
standard is met, require de novo consideration by the appellate court; in
such consideration the court will defer to the trial court's findings on
disputed fact questions involving the credibility of witnesses and will not
disturb the trial court's ruling unless it is clearly erroneous. 156
In Woolbright v. Sun Communications, Inc. 157 the Missouri Supreme
Court apparently followed the Rosenbloom theory (although it did not cite
Rosenbloom) and held that the New York Times standard applies where a
private plaintiff is involved in a matter of "public concern." ' 5 1
Two other post-New York Times Missouri cases are worthy of mention
on the public figure-public official question. In Brown v. Kitterman, the
court stated in dictum that the plaintiff, the manager of a government-
funded community center, was a public official in the New York Times
sense. 1 59  In Lazier v. Pulitzer Publishing Co. the court found that the
these positions. He was just a deputy marshall in a village of some
1,000 persons, but insofar as the 250 families residing in Lake
Tapawingo were concerned, his actions and activities were of real con-
cern. The range of official activities, personal and official acts taken by
him, were probably of more direct concern to the persons residing in
his jurisdiction than were the doings of the Director of the F.B.I.
Id. at 857.
A more recent case finding a police patrolman a public official for purposes
of applying the New York Times rule is Ramacciotti v. Zinn, 550 S.W.2d 217 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1977).
153. 446 S.W.2d at 858 (defendant accused plaintiff of perjury).
154. Id. at 853.
155. 499 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
156. Id. at 49.
157. 480 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. 1972).
158. Id. at 867. The plaintiff was an auctioneer. Defendant newspaper pub-
lished a statement by a county prosecuting attorney to the effect that plaintiff
was a "known check forger" who was "apparently using the names and bank
account numbers of purchasers [at an auction] to forge checks."
159. 443 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Mo. 1969).
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plaintiff, whose byline had appeared on over 600 cooking columns in the
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, was not a public figure because she did not have
access to public communications in the way that a true public figure
would have and she had not drawn herself into the midst of any public
controversy. 160
The most recent Missouri Supreme Court application of the New
York Times rule came in Glover v. Herald Co. 161 The plaintiff, a St. Louis
city alderwoman, was quoted by the St. Louis Globe-Democrat as saying
she had had an abortion. In fact, the statement had been made by
another alderwoman, but a newspaper rewrite man mixed up the two
names in taking the information from the reporter who attended the
meeting at which the statement was made. The supreme court held that
the New York Times standard applied because the plaintiff was a public
official and reversed a plaintiff's judgment because there was no finding
the defendants were anything more than negligent.
B. The Gertz Case
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 162 a 5-4 majority of the U.S. Supreme
Court backed away from the plurality position in Rosenbloom 163 that the
New York Times standard should be applied to private defamation plain-
tiffs involved in a matter of public or general interest. Plaintiff Elmer
Gertz was an attorney retained by the family of a youth who had been
shot to death by a Chicago policeman named Nuccio. Gertz was retained
to prosecute a civil action aginst Nuccio and had no substantial connec-
tion with a successful state prosecution of Nuccio for second-degree
murder. Defendant Robert Welch, Inc. was the publisher of American
Opinion, the monthly magazine of the John Birch Society. In March,
1969 the magazine published an article headlined, "FRAME-UP: Richard
Nuccio and the War on Police," which purported to show that testimony
at Nuccio's criminal trial was false and his prosecution was part of a
Communist conspiracy against the police. Plaintiff Gertz was portrayed
in the article as an architect of the frame-up. The article also stated that
Chicago police had a file on Gertz that took a "big, Irish cop to lift."
Gertz further was alleged to have been a member and officer of various
Communist-front organizations, including one group that allegedly
planned an attack on police during the 1968 Democratic National Con-
vention in Chicago, and was described as a "Leninist" and a "Com-
munist-fronter." Published with the article was a photograph of Gertz
with the caption, "Elmer Gertz of the Red Guild harasses Nuccio." The
160. 467 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Mo. 1971).
161. 549 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
162. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
163. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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evidence in Gertz' libel action was that the allegations were false and that
the defendant had not checked the accuracy of the story. Anticipating
the Rosenbloom holding, the trial judge entered judgment n.o.v. for the
defendant on the ground that the New York Times standard should apply
because the publication concerned a matter of public interest. The ap-
peals court affirmed, citing Rosenbloom which was handed down in the
interim. 164
The United States Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial.
In withdrawing from the Rosenbloom theory, the Court held that so long
as they do not impose liability without fault, the states may choose their
own standard of liability in an action for defamation brought by a pri-
vate individual against a news medium.165  The Court also held that
actual damages may not be presumed and punitive damages may not be
awarded to a private defamation plaintiff, at least in the absence of a
showing of New York Times malice.16 6
The Court noted that the legitimate state interest underlying the law
of libel is "the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on
them by defamatory falsehood ...." The New York Times standard has
been applied, in the case of public officials and public figures, as an
accommodation between the interests of the state and the interests of the
news media in order to assure freedom of speech.' 67  However, the
states have a greater interest in protecting private individuals for two
reasons: first, private persons do not have access to channels of public
communication to defend themselves; and second, public officials and
most public figures assume the risk of defamatory statements concerning
their public lives, but private individuals cannot be said to have assumed
such a risk.1 68  The Court found that, because the states have a greater
interest in protecting private persons from defamation, the Rosenbloom
theory would restrict the state interest to an unacceptable degree.
Further, the Rosenbloom theory would occasion "the additional difficulty
of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which
publications address issues of "general or public interest" and which do
not .... We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience
of judges .... ",169
Taking all these factors into consideration, the Court held that
so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability
for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injuri-
ous to a private individual .... At least this conclusion obtains
164. 418 U.S. at 325-32.
165. Id. at 347.
166. Id. at 349.
167. Id. at 341-43.
168. Id. at 344-45.
169. Id. at 346.
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where, as here, the substance of the defamatory statement
makes substantial danger to reputation apparent .... Our in-
quiry would involve considerations somewhat different from
those discussed above if a State purported to condition civil lia-
bility on a factual misstatement whose content did not warn a
reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory po-
tential .... 170
There are several points to be noted about this holding. First, it is clearly
meant to apply only to a news media defendant.'71 Apparently, a state
court would be able to impose strict liability upon a private defendant
sued by a private plaintiff.1 7 2 The Restatement (Second) of Torts, however,
takes the view that the principle of Gertz is broad enough to cover this
situation and that strict liability does not apply in any case.173 A second
point is that the holding seems to require a minimum standard of negli-
gence, but does not preclude the states from selecting a higher standard
of liability such as recklessness. 7 4  Further, the Gertz holding applies to
libel; the Restatement expresses the view that most states will apply it to
slander as well.' 75 Another point to note is the Court's statement con-
cerning a "factual misstatement whose content did not warn a reasonably
prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential." This appar-
ently is a reference to the doctrine of libel per quod. Justice White, in a
dissenting opinion, concluded that the Court, if faced with such a case,
would apply a New York Times actual malice standard.17 6 A final point is
that requiring the plaintiff to prove the defendant was at least negligent
could have the effect of rendering the common law conditional
privileges nugatory, at least in states where negligence has been held
sufficient to overcome such privileges.'7 7
A second major holding in Gertz concerned damages. The Court
stated that the state interest in compensating private persons for reputa-
tion injury due to defamation "extends no further than compensation
for actual injury." Thus the Court held that "the States may not permit
recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not
170. Id. at 347-48.
171. Where it speaks of the standard of liability, the opinion is liberally
sprinkled with references to "publishers," "newspapers," "broadcasters,", and the
"press and broadcast media." Of course, any reference to nonmedia defendants
would be dictum because the case involved a magazine publisher.
172. Indeed, some states have done so since Gertz. See Part IV, § B infra.
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Comment d (Tent. Draft No.
21, 1975).
174. Some states have applied a higher standard than negligence as to truth
or falsity in defamation actions brought by private individuals. See Part IV, § B
infra.
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Comment d (Tent. Draft No.
21, 1975).
176. 418 U.S. at 389 n.27.
177. This point is discussed in more detail in Part V infra.
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based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth." ' 7 8 As additional justifications for this rule, the Court stated that
the uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages absent actual in-
jury inhibits free speech, and that the doctrine of presumed damages
allows juries to punish unpopular opinions rather than merely compen-
sate the plaintiff for his injuries. Thus, defamation plaintiffs are re-
stricted to compensation for actual injury, which is not limited to
out-of-pocket loss but may include "impairment of reputation and
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish
and suffering." Juries must be limited by appropriate instructions on
damages, and damage awards "must be supported by competent evi-
dence concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence which
assigns an actual dollar value to the injury." 17 9 As to punitive damages,
the Court expressed dismay that juries are allowed to assess such dam-
ages in "wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to
the actual harm caused," and that such damages were used by juries to
punish unpopular views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages, puni-
tive damages may lead to media self-censorship. Thus, the Court con-
cluded that "the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability
under a less demanding standard than that stated by New York Times may
recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual
injury."' 180 The Court discarded the common law rule that punitive
damages may be awarded on a showing of ill will or reckless indifference
to consequences.181
It is unclear if these holdings as to presumed and punitive damages
were intended to apply to nonmedia defendants as well as media defen-
dants; the language in this area of the opinion makes only one reference
to media-when it says punitive damages may lead to media self-censor-
ship. Limiting Gertz to its facts, the holding would apply only to media
defendants, but the Court seems to have intended that it apply to all
defamation cases involving private plaintiffs.'8 2
A remaining question is whether the Court, in listing the types of
injury for which damages may be recovered, intended to intimate that
damages for such things as personal humiliation and mental suffering
may be recovered without proof of injury to reputation, which, after all,
is the essence of defamation. Commentators have read the holding as
178. 418 U.S. at 349.
179. Id. at 350.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 395-96 (White, J., dissenting).
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975), takes
the position that the holding as to actual damages should apply in all cases, ex-
pressing the view in Comment b that it is unlikely the states will apply a different
rule in the case of nonmedia defendants. The rationale that a state has no inter-
est in securing gratuitous awards unrelated to actual injury for a private plaintiff
would seem to apply whether the defendant is media or nonmedia.
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affirming the common law rule: that recovery for emotional injuries is
precluded except as "parasitic" damages once injury to reputation is
shown.1 8 3 Note, however, that in a subsequent case the Court found
that a state may permit a plaintiff to base a defamation action on
grounds other than injury to reputation.'8 4
The other major holding in Gertz related to the definition of a pub-
lic figure. The Court discussed two alternative bases for finding a person
to be a public figure. He may "achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety
that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts.
More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn
into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure
for a limited range of issues." In either event, "such persons assume
special prominence in the resolution of public questions." 185 Hypotheti-
cally, the Court stated, it may be possible for someone to become an
involuntary public figure, but such instances would be "exceedingly
rare." 1
86
Applying these standards in Gertz, the Court found that although
the plaintiff was well known in legal circles, he "had achieved no general
fame or notoriety in the community." None of the prospective jurors
had ever heard of him. The Court said it would not lightly assume an
individual's participation in professional and civic affairs would make
him a public figure for all purposes and that it is preferable to look at
an individual's participation "in the particular controversy giving rise to
the defamation." The Court found that Gertz was not a public figure for
purposes of this action: "He plainly did not thrust himself into the vor-
tex of this public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in an
attempt to influence its outcome." '8 7
This holding demonstrated an intent to narrow the definition of
"public figure," an intent which was reasserted in Time, Inc. v. Fire-
183. See, e.g., Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REv. 422,
472 (1975), where the author states that this conclusion follows "from the Court's
insistence that the states not transcend their legitimate interest in compensating
for actual injury to reputation.... To permit recovery for emotional injuries
when no actual injury to reputation exists would subvert the 'actual loss' re-
quirement."
184. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976). This apparently re-
sulted from Florida law which permitted a defamation plaintiff to recover for
other injuries where damage to reputation is not claimed.
One commentator has suggested that this holding in Firestone could have two
results: converting the defamation action into something resembling the common
law tort of intentional infliction of mental distress, and returning to the pre-Gertz
rule of presumed damages. Note, 43 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 123, 137-38 (1976).
185. 418 U.S. at 351.
186. Id. at 345.
187. Id. at 352.
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stone.1 8 8 In that case the plaintiff was the socially prominent wife of the
heir to a tire manufacturing fortune, and the controversy revolved
around her suit for divorce. Even though there was a great deal of pub-
lic interest in the divorce action, the Court found that she was not a
public figure, partly on the ground that a marriage dissolution "is not
the sort of 'public controversy' referred to in Gertz, even though the
marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may be of interest to
some portion of the reading public." 's 9 The Court found that the fact
that Mrs. Firestone had held several press conferences during the di-
vorce proceedings did not render her a public figure. The interviews
were not an attempt to influence the result of the divorce dispute and
were not used by the plaintiff to inject herself into some unrelated pub-
lic controversy. 9 0 In a strong dissent, Justice Marshall suggested that
the Court's conclusion that a marriage dissolution is not a "public con-
troversy" would result in reinstating the Rosenbloom theory and resur-
recting "the precise difficulties that ... Gertz was designed to avoid."' 9'
A complete discussion of the public figure issue is beyond the scope of
this comment, but a number of cases have dealt with the issue since
Gertz, and it is certain to be the subject of continuing litigation. 92
IV. REACTION OF OTHER STATES To GERTZ
The courts of at least 18 states have had occasion to apply Gertz to
their defamation law, and the substantial majority has picked negligence
as the appropriate standard of liability. Several states have conditioned
liability on a showing of something more than negligence where the def-
amation of a private plaintiff concerns a matter of public interest. At
least one state appears to have concluded that the common law still
applies in the case of the private plaintiff and the private defendant.
The cases in two states defy categorization.
188. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
189. Id. at 454.
190. Id. at 454-55 n.3.
191. Id. at 487 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192. Despite the restrictive definition in Gertz and Firestone, lower courts have
continued to find plaintiffs to be public figures. See, e.g., Rosanova v. Playboy
Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (alleged Mafia figure with
substantial prior publicity in relation to underworld ties and relationship with
Teamsters president Fitzsimmons); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp.
1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977) (author
of Papa Hemingway, a Personal Memoir, in connection with defendant's book about
Hemingway); James v. Gannett Co., Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 353 N.E.2d 834, 386
N.Y.S.2d 871 (1976) (belly dancer in connection with interview granted to news-
paper). See also Note, supra note 184; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A,
Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
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The most thoughtful and scholarly state court opinion applying
Gertz is the Maryland Court of Appeals decision in Jacron Sales Company
v. Sindof.'93 The court first noted that, on its facts, Gertz applied only
to libel cases involving private plaintiffs and media defendants. The
court also noted that discussion of important issues may occur in non-
media contexts, and therefore the free speech rationale of Gertz would
seem to apply to nonmedia defendants as well. The court held that the
Gertz ruling should apply to both libel and slander and to media and
nonmedia defendants alike.' 94 As a further justification for this holding
the court stated that any other approach would complicate further an
already confused area of the law.' 95 The Maryland court adopted the
negligence standard of liability stated in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts ' 96 and held that the burden of proving falsity rests on the plaintiff,
because under such standard he is required to establish negligence with
respect to falsity.' 97 The level of proof of fault was held to be a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.' 98 The court also considered the relation-
ship between the negligence fault standard and the common law qual-
ified privileges. It concluded that such privilege is still viable because
Maryland law requires reckless disregard of the truth to overcome the
privilege.' 99 Thus, where a qualified privilege is found, the lower negli-
gence standard is subsumed in the reckless disregard standard and the
fact that the plaintiff may leap the lower hurdle of negligence is of no
consequence.20 0
Besides Maryland, the courts of Hawaii, 20' Illinois, 202 Kansas, 203
193. 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
194. Id. at 592, 350 A.2d at 695.
195. Id. at 593, 350 A.2d at 696.
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
197. 276 Md. at 597, 350 A.2d at 698.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 599-600, 350 A.2d at 699. The court noted that several commen-
tators have suggested that a negligence standard would render the common law
qualified privileges obsolete because one way of overcoming a conditional
privilege would be to prove negligence on the defendant's part, the standard
adopted by many states as well as the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 601 (1938), and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Comment k (Tent. Draft No. 21,
1975).
200. 276 Md. at 600, 350 A.2d at 700.
201. Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Haw. 522, 543 P.2d 1356
(1975) (negligence standard as to all private plaintiffs; higher standard for mat-
ters of public interest specifically rejected).
202. Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975) (negligence
standard applied to all cases involving private defendants; higher standard for
matters of public interest specifically rejected; absolute and qualified privileges
may be applied as the facts warrant).
203. Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975) (negli-
gence standard where private plaintiff sues media defendant).
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Massachusetts, 2 °4 North Carolina, 20 5 Ohio,20 6 Oklahoma,20 7 Tennes-
see,2 0 8 Texas,2 0 9 and Washington 21 0 have adopted a negligence standard
in one form or another.
B. Special Standards For Matters of Public Concern
Courts in four states have determined that a standard of liability
higher than negligence is appropriate where a private plaintiff is de-
famed as to a matter of public interest or concern. An Indiana inter-
mediate appeals court adopted the Rosenbloom theory and held that a
private plaintiff who was defamed concerning a matter of public interest
must prove that the statement was published with knowledge of its falsity
or in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.211 The court justified its
holding primarily on the ground that a negligence standard would lead
to media self-censorship. It also expressed the view that the Gertz pro-
hibition on punitive damages would not alleviate the uncertainties of a
negligence standard, and that the Supreme Court's broad definition of
actual damages in Gertz would not significantly decrease the risk of ca-
pricious jury verdicts.2 12
The Colorado Supreme Court arrived at a similar holding in Walker
v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc.21 3 It, too, held that a private plaintiff de-
famed by the news media as to a matter of public interest must prove
204. Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1704, 330
N.E.2d 161 (1975) (negligence standard for all private persons; punitive damages
not allowed even upon showing of New York Times malice).
205. Walters v. Sanford Herald, Inc., 31 N.C. App. 233, 228 S.E.2d 766
(1976) (negligence standard as to all private plaintiffs).
206. Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc., v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d
105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975) (private plaintiff
must prove defendant was negligent or acted with common law malice).
207. Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976) (private
plaintiffs defamed by news media must prove negligence; statutory presumptions
of malice and damages ruled unconstitutional).
208. Nichols v. Memphis Publishing Co., No. 3 (Tenn., cert. granted May 2,
1977) (private plaintiff must prove newspaper defendant "did not act with
reasonable care under all the circumstances").
209. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex, 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977) (private plaintiff defamed by news medium must
prove negligence; no liability for a factual misstatement whose content would not
warn a defendant of its defamatory potential).
210. Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976)
(private plaintiff defamed as to matter of public interest must prove negligence;
punitive damages iot allowed under any circumstances).
211. Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc.,
321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
212. Id. at 588-89. The court's strong protective attitude toward freedom of
the press was engendered, in part, by provisions of the Indiana state constitu-
tion.
213. 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
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New York Times malice. However, the court said the New York Times rule
should be interpreted without the St. Amant gloss "since the term 'reck-
less disregard' has had rather frequent usage in the tort field in this
state." 214 This court also justified its decision primarily on the ground
that a lesser standard of liability would chill freedom of the press. 215
An Arizona intermediate appeals court held that a private plaintiff
defamed by a news medium concerning a matter of public interest may
recover only upon a showing of New York Times malice or common law
express malice in the same sense of spite or ill will towards the plain-
tiff.216
Finally, the New York Court of Appeals has held that where a pri-
vate plaintiff is defamed by a news medium as to a matter which is "ar-
guably within the sphere of legitimate public concern, which is reason-
ably related to matters warranting public exposition," the plaintiff may
recover only upon a showing that the publisher acted in a "grossly irre-
sponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of infor-
mation gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible
parties." 21 7 The standard seems to be an intermediate between simple
negligence and New York Times recklessness and is reminiscent of the
plurality standard in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v.
Walker.218
C. Miscellaneous Holdings
In a decision notable for its opacity, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
apparently has decided that Gertz does not apply in a case involving a
private plaintiff and a private defendant. 219 Additionally, the court al-
lowed recovery of punitive damages upon a finding of common law ex-
press malice instead of New York Times malice; 220 this holding is seem-
ingly erroneous under Gertz.
In a Virginia case the court found that it did not need to determine
the appropriate standard of liability in a defamation case involving a
private plaintiff because the plaintiff had proved New York Times malice
in any event. Rather, the issue was whether the plaintiff could recover
punitive damages even though actual damages were neither proved nor
found. The court stated:
214. Id. at 99, 538 P.2d at 457.
215. Id. at 99, 538 P.2d at 458.
216. Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 26 Ariz. App. 274, 547 P.2d 1074
(1976).
217. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d
569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
218. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
219. Calero v. Del Chemical Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
220. Id. at 509, 228 N.W.2d at 750.
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We find nothing in Gertz that prohibits an award of punitive
damages in the absence of actual or compensatory damages.
Thus, we hold that punitive damages may be awarded without
actual or compensatory damages if a plaintiff shows per se def-
amation by the media and meets by clear and convincing evi-
dence the New York Times standard of actual malice. 221
Two decisions by different intermediate appeals courts in Louisiana
appear to be in conflict. One impliedly embraces a negligence standard
for private plaintiffs,2 22 and the other impliedly endorses a New York
Times malice standard for private plaintiffs. 2 2  However, neither case
purported to adopt a standard for the state.
V. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF GERTz ON Missouvi LAW
A. Status of the Parties
Considered on only its fdicts, Gertz seems to require that Missouri no
longer impose strict liability for a defamatory falsehood concerning a
private plaintiff where the defendant is a news medium; strictly speak-
ing, it does not require a departure from common law strict liability
where a private plaintiff sues a private defendant. While such a narrow
reading may be technically correct, it is believed not to be the best ap-
proach for a number of reasons. The Missouri Supreme Court should
apply Gertz to all defamation cases involving private plaintiffs whether or
not the defendant is a news medium.
One reason for applying Gertz to nonmedia defendants is that the
constitutional right being protected is freedom of speech, not just free-
dom of the press.224 If the rationale of New York Times, Curtis v. Butts,
and Gertz is that the defense of truth is insufficient by itself to protect
free discussion of important issues, then the Gertz principle should be
extended to cases involving nonmedia defendants; such issues must be
discussed freely in nonmedia as well as in media contexts. If it is impor-
tant for a writer to express freely his ideas on a newspaper editorial
page, it is equally important for a speaker to be able to speak without
fear whether he is addressing a crowded auditorium or conversing with
a neighbor in his living room. The progeny of New York Times provide
an instructive analogy in this regard. New York Times v. Sullivan arose in
a media contex, but it was not limited to media defendants; indeed,
later cases have applied the New York Times standard in nonmedia cases.
221. Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 224 S.E.2d 132, 136
(1976).
222. Wilson v. Capital City Press, 315 So. 2d 393 (La. App. 1975).
223. LeBoeuf v. Times-Picayune Publishing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430 (La. App.
1976).
224. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 341-43.
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In Garrison v. Louisiana 225 the defamatory remarks were made during a
press conference; in St. Amant v. Thompson 226 they were made during a
televised speech. In these cases the media merely served as vehicles for
defamatory statements by the nonmedia defendants, and the Supreme
Court focused on the issues of free speech and public debate rather than
protection of the news media. In this regard the strongest argument for
Missouri applying Gertz to nonmedia defendants is Rowden v. Amich, 22 7 a
Missouri case which applied the New York Times standard to a private
defendant sued by a minor public official. A further reason for not dis-
tinguishing between media and nonmedia defendants is that the Su-
preme Court recently has rejected the proposition that the media enjoy
any greater rights than the public at large.228
Apart from constitutional considerations, there are state law princi-
ples which favor the application of Gertz to nonmedia as well as media
defendants. Holding the media liable for negligence while imposing
strict liability on private defendants would be an incongruous result in
terms of the usual tort law argument for strict liability, i.e., that it
spreads the cost of injury over all users of a given product. 229  Perhaps
a better reason for applying Gertz to nonmedia defendants, however, is
that it would be a salutary move toward simplifying a field of law which
already is overly complex. 230  If Gertz is limited to media defendants,
225. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
226. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
227. 446 S.W.2d 849 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969). The defendant, a private citizen
of Lake Tapawingo, mailed allegedly defamatory letters concerning the plaintiff
to all other homes in the village as part of his effort to have the plaintiff re-
moved from his position of deputy' marshall.
228. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974). The Court disagreed with
a newspaper's contention that it had a constitutional right to interview inmates of
a state correctional system despite a regulation prohibiting such contacts.
229. Comment, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 41, 148 n.52
(1974). The commentator states: "Further, an individual's defamatory statement
is, on the whole, likely to create a smaller risk of harm than a media publication.
Finally, the media are more likely to be aware of the risk of liability, and thus
more likely to insure against it .. "
230. The common law defamation actions developed according to no particu-
lar plan, and
there is a great deal of the law of defamation which makes no sense. It
contains anomalies and absurdities for which no legal writer ever has
had a kind word, and it is a curious compound of a strict liability
imposed upon innocent defendants, as rigid and extreme as anything
found in the law, with a blind and almost perverse refusal to compen-
sate the plaintiff for real and very serious harm. The explanation is in
part one of historical accident and survival, in part one of the conflict
of opposing ideas of policy in which our traditional notions of freedom
of expression have collided violently with sympathy for the victim
traduced and indignation at the maligning tongue.
W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 111 at 737.
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three tests of liability would be required: (1) a strict liability test for pri-
vate plaintiffs versus nonmedia defendants; (2) a negligence (or other
non-strict liability) test for private plaintiffs versus media defendants;
and (3) the New York Times test for public officials or public figures ver-
sus media and nonmedia defendants. In contrast, only two tests would
be required if Gertz is applied to nonmedia as well as media defendants.
B. Libel and Slander
If Gertz is read narrowly, it will apply to cases of libel, but not to
slander cases. It is submitted that this is too narrow a view, for the same
reasons cited in the preceding section. The freedom being protected is
freedom of speech, and not just freedom of the press. 231 It seems in-
conceivable that the United States Supreme Court would hold that a pri-
vate plaintiff could recover on a strict liability basis for a slander pub-
lished by a radio or television station. However, that situation could arise
in Missouri as there is no authority whether radio or television defama-
tion constitutes libel or slander.23 2 Failing to extend the Gertz holding to
slander cases would add one more complexity to an already complicated
body of law.
C. Standard of Liability
As noted earlier2 33 Gertz appears to require a minimum standard of
negligence but does not preclude the states from selecting a higher stan-
dard of liability such as recklessness. It is suggested that the negligence
standard is appropriate for most cases since it is closest to the common
law strict liability and because it can serve the function of balancing the
demands of free speech against the reputational right of private indi-
viduals. By adopting a negligence standard, Missouri would be consistent
with the majority of state courts that have considered the question.23 4
231. The rationale for applying Gertz to nonmedia defendants and to slander
as well as libel is stated aptly in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Com-
ment e (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975):
As the Supreme Court declares, the protection of the First Amend-
ment extends to freedom of speech as well as to freedom of the press,
and the interests which must be balanced to obtain a proper accomo-
dation are similar. It would seem strange to hold that the press, com-
posed of professionals and causing must greater damage because of
the wider distribution of the communication, can constitutionally be
held liable only for negligence, but that a private person, engaged in a
casual private conversation with a single person, can be held liable at
his peril if the statement turns out to be false, without any regard to
his lack of fault.
232. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
233. See notes 170-74 and accompanying text supra.
234. See Part IV supra.
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There is, however, precedent in Missouri for applying the New York
Times standard to cases where a private plaintiff is defamed by a media
defendant as to a matter of public interest. 235 This is, of course, the
Rosenbloom approach which was rejected in Gertz. All the arguments set
forth in Gertz against this approach would apply. While the approach
does offer more protection for freedom of the press, it would add
another layer of complexity to defamation law. It also could be argued
that a negligence standard will achieve the same goal sought by the
Rosenbloom approach, i.e., in balancing the gravity of the harm to a pri-
vate plaintiff against the utility of a defendant news medium's publica-
tion, an issue of public concern would weigh on the defendant's side of
the scale. A counter-argument is that a negligence standard will inhibit
publication on matters of public interest because of the editor's or
broadcaster's inability to guess whether or not a jury would balance the
issues in favor of him in a particular case. On balance, and considering
the difficulty in defining what is a matter of public interest or concern,
the Missouri Supreme Court should apply a negligence standard in all
cases involving a private plaintiff and a media defendant.
It would be helpful for trial courts and the practicing bar if the
Missouri Supreme Court would set forth some guidelines for applying a
negligence standard to defamation cases. In this regard, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts may provide some assistance. According to the Restate-
ment draftsmen, the general standard of care applied to the news media
would be the skill and experience normally possessed by members of the
journalism profession, and expert testimony would be appropriate to
establish this standard.2 3 6  Among factors to be considered in deciding
whether the defendant acted reasonably in investigating and publishing
an item would be the publication schedule (e.g., daily, weekly, monthly),
the nature of the interests the defendant sought to promote, and the
extent of damage to the plaintiff's reputation.
23 7
It should be noted that, as a practical matter, the plaintiff will have
to prove the defendant's negligence as to the falsity of the publication
and therefore will be forced to plead and prove the falsity of the defa-
mation. In this regard, the courts will have to decide on the appropriate
burden of proof. While a public figure or official must prove New York
Times "actual malice" by clear and convincing proof,238 nothing in Gertz
seems to require that level of proof in a negligence context. It is
suggested that Missouri continue to give the standard burden of proof
235. Woolbright v. Sun Communications, Inc., 480 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. 1972).
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Comment f (Tent. Draft No.
21, 1975).
237. Id., Comment h.
238. The test derives from the New York Times requirement of "convincing
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instruction 239 in defamation cases involving a negligence standard be-
cause this is more apt to be understood by the jury and is the standard
applied in other negligence cases.
D. Damages
Under Gertz the plaintiff must prove actual damages in order to re-
cover, and the jury must be instructed appropriately as to the allowable
elements of damage (injury to reputation and emotional injuries). Dam-
ages may not be presumed, and punitive damages may not be awarded
in the absence of a showing of New York Times malice. 240 As noted ear-
lier, 2 41 it is unclear whether these holdings as to damages are applicable
to all defamation cases, but once again it is submitted that they should be
applied across the board in the interest of simplicity. One way of
achieving this would be to make damage to the plaintiff's reputation a
separate paragraph in the verdict-directing instructions for libel and
slander, and allow emotional injuries as an optional additional submis-
sion. In conjunction with the general damage instruction, 242 this would
seem to meet Gertz' requirement as to actual damages. Of course, counsel
should be permitted in closing argument to elaborate on the allowable
elements of damage.243 Assuming there is at least some slight damage
to the plaintiff's reputation, there does not seem to be any language in
Gertz that would halt the practice of allowing nominal damages to re-
deem reputation.
It should be noted that the currently approved instruction for puni-
tive damages in defamation cases 244 probably runs afoul of Gertz by not
requiring a finding of New York Times malice.
Another problem in the damages area is whether to continue the
common law requirement that special damages must be pleaded and
proved in cases of libel per quod and slander not per se. It is submitted
that it would be valid to continue this additional protection for the de-
fendant in such cases, though the Missouri Supreme Court could choose
to let the Gertz actual damage requirement provide this type of protec-
tion in all defamation cases in the interest of simplifying the law.
E. Qualified Privileges
The supreme court will need to consider the interrelationship of the
standard of liability with common law qualified privilege. This will re-
quire resolution of the uncertainty whether mere negligence as to truth
239. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 3.01 (1969 ed.).
240. See notes 178-81 and accompanying text supra.
241. See note 182 and accompanying text supra.
242. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 4.01 (1969 ed.).
243. See notes 125, 179 and accompanying text supra.
244. See note 129 supra.
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or falsity destroys the privilege, or whether recklessness is required.2 45 If
it is decided that negligence will overcome the privilege, the entire law of
qualified privilege would be irrelevant in cases where Gertz applies be-
cause in proving negligence, the plaintiff will not only have met the Gertz
test, but also will have overcome any possible qualified privilege. On the
other hand, if it is decided that recklessness as to truth or falsity is
necessary to vitiate a qualified privilege, that privilege would retain its
vitality even after Gertz. In this case, even though the plaintiff might be
able to prove the negligence required by Gertz, he still would fail to re-
cover if he could not go a step further and prove recklessness to over-
come the privilege.
As a matter of simplifying the law, it could be decided that negli-
gence will overcome qualified privileges, thus rendering the privileges
nugatory. In that event the balancing process described by the law of
qualified privilege would be taken over by the balancing process as-
sociated with all negligence determinations.
F. Summary of Recommendations and Unresolved Issues
A negligence standard should be applied to all defamation cases in-
volving private plaintiffs whether the defendant is a news medium or a
nonmedia defendant and whether the action is libel or slander.
Guidelines should be developed for applying the negligence standard.
The Gertz holdings on damages should be applied to all defamation
cases. Whether qualified privilege should retain its vitality must be de-
cided.
Beyond the above more easily addressed questions, a number of
questions and problems await further development in federal and state
cases. For instance, Gertz raised but did not answer the question of the
appropriate standard of liability in cases of libel per quod. It may be that
the United States Supreme Court will require a showing of New York
Times malice in such a case. Further, it is unclear whether the Supreme
Court will allow presumed and punitive damages on a showing of New
York Times malice. The definition of a public figure will require de-
velopment, and the question of the proper standard of liability for def-
amation of a public figure or official in relation to his private life also
requires an answer.
An area that merits consideration by the courts and the legislatures
is the development of alternative remedies for defamation. One prom-
ising possibility would be a declaratory judgment to vindicate the plain-
tiff's reputation.246
245. See notes 114-16 and accompanying text supra.
246. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, Special Note on Remedies for De-
famation Other Than Damages, at 81 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
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As judges and legislators ponder the problems in this area, the two
guiding lights upon which they should fix their eyes are the sometimes
competing, sometimes compatible interests of free speech and the indi-
vidual's right to privacy.
STEPHEN C. SCOTT
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